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Abstract—With the growing complexity of networks and
communications protocols that become increasingly enormous
and extensive, we are confronted with the problem of covert
channel that affects the confidentiality and integrity of data sent
in the network. Covert channels also known as hidden channels
can elude basic security systems such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) and firewalls. We propose in this work a method
to monitor and detect the presence of hidden channels that
are based on an essential monitoring protocol “Internet Control
Message Protocol” (ICMP). We undergo the network traffic with
a set of verifications ranging from simple fields verification to
more complex pattern matching operations. To validate our idea,
we have installed Ptunnel, a tool that allows to tunnel TCP
connections to a remote host using ICMP echo request and reply
packets. Our experimental results show the possibility to discover
such malicious traffic with high performance.
Keywords—Network Security; Covert Channel; Storage Chan-
nel; Traffic analysis; ICMP protocol, ICMP Tunneling; Tunneling
Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of computer networks in recent years has
led to the development of new technologies and services but
also the emergence of new threats that destroy our data.
According to Lampson [2], attacking covert channels occurs
when the communication of information between two parties is
secretly done via a chain which is not intended for the sending
of information. The purpose of using hidden channels is to
send data in the network while ensuring that the sending is
unnoticed by a third party and without alerting any firewalls
or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) on the network. This is
done for several purposes such as (a) using the resources of
others to send secret data, (b) data leakage, (c) installation,
distribution and control of malicious software, (d) bypass
security devices such as firewall, etc.
In the literature, covert channels can be classified into two
categories, timing and storage channels [4]:
• A Timing Channel is a covert channel in which a
process reports information to another process while
manipulating the time it takes to perform a given
operation. The other process can observe to understand
what happened.
• Storage Channels are based on shared data storage
areas such as Unused or optional protocol fields.
They include all means that would allow the direct
or indirect writing at the storage area by a process
and the direct or indirect reading of it by another one.
With the increased use of hidden channels that violates
security policies, it has become necessary to find counter
measures to detect this type of attacks. Several research works
were done to defeat covert channels. They are mainly two
countermeasure approaches. The first one relies on actively
modifying optional and unused protocol fields whether there
is or not a covert channel. The method has the drawbacks to
change even safe traffic, introduces some delays and consumes
computing resources. The second approach passively super-
vises network traffic and undertakes some controls looking for
suspicious activities. In this case, it notifies the administrator
about the presence of covert channels. In this work, we are
interested in storage covert channels and we apply the passive
monitoring approach to tackle this problem. We conduct many
verification controls:
• Check ICMP messages size.
• Check the number of Echo Reply messages for a given
Echo Request.
• Check if there is a spike in the number of ICMP
messages.
• Check patterns.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II describes some related works. Section III explains
ICMP protocol and presents our detection method. Section IV
discusses the experimental results. We devote Section V to
assess the detection performance of our method. We draw in
Section VI the conclusion and we mention some future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
Several researchers have oriented their research axes to
detect covert channel attacks using multiple methods and
techniques. Covert channels can be divided into Timing covert
channels and Storage covert channels. In a timing covert
channel, the bits of the covert information are represented
by varying the time interval between the sent packets. S.
Gianvecchio and H.Wang in [1] propose a detection system
that measures changes in entropy and in corrected conditional
entropy (CCE) within the network to determine if timing
channels are being used. A change in the entropy of a process
provides a critical clue for covert timing channel detection. P.
L. Shrestha et al [6] provide a framework based on Support
Vector Machine (SVM) classifier to detect covert timing chan-
nel. They derive four popular fingerprints (K-S test, regularity
score, entropy, and corrected conditional entropy) from the
traffic under investigation to form the SVM classifier.
By mounting storage covert channels, the hidden data
is written in optional or unset protocol fields. The research
works can be grouped according to the exploited network
protocol. Using TCP protocol, E. Tumoian and M. Anikeev
analyzed the accuracy of a neural network to detect the covert
channel in the TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) field [9].
First, the neural network was formed to predict successive
ISNs for different operating systems. Then, they monitored
the ISNs used and compared them to the prediction models
by measuring their statistical deviance. If an ISN sequence
did not match any pattern indicating a normal deviation of
the generated ISN then it may be a covert channel. H. Song
and X. Li calculated an anomaly score that corresponds to
the sum of weighted frequencies on all flag combinations in
one second [7]. A high score indicates a suspect traffic. Then,
the authors monitored and tested the decrease of TCP sequence
numbers, considered as abnormal. They completed their traffic
analysis by calculating the variance of TCP sequence numbers
within a moving time window then compared it against the
variance baseline for a normal traffic. A deviation may reveal
the presence of hidden channels.
Using ICMP protocol as a medium for a covert channel,
Sohn, et al. [5] proposed a detection method based on Support
Vector Machine (SVM) to learn ICMP packets payload charac-
teristics. They used Loki2 to generate abnormal ICMP packets
and Tcpdump to capture network traffic. They preprocessed
collected packets to extract the characteristic of ICMP packets
headers and payloads. After a training phase, they built an
SVM classifier able to discern suspect ICMP packets. In [8] K.
Stokes et al. tested the efficiency of firewalls and IDS to detect
ICMP based hidden channels. They concluded that covert
channels can easily defeat many modern security appliances
if ICMP protocol is permitted. In [3] D. N. Muchene et al.
transformed the covert channels to a secure reporting system
of security alerts. They considered that this covert network
communication combined with sophisticated insider threat
monitoring tools, will improve security level and raise the costs
and risks for intruders.
Existing research works consider that security technologies
such as Firewalls and IDS cannot detect exactly the attacks of
covert channels. Besides, exploited protocols are fundamental,
so they cannot be deactivated. Regarding the capital impor-
tance of these protocols and the fact that they are very much
used, we propose a detection method of hidden channels that
rely on ICMP protocol.
III. PROTOCOL DESIGN
A. ICMP Overview
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is one of fun-
damental protocols of TCP/IP stack. It operates in the network
layer and is mainly used to send control and error messages
between endpoints. An ICMP packet is usually generated as a
result of a diagnosis by another network protocol or a failure of
transmission. As shown in Figure 1, ICMP header is composed
of several fields that are Type, Code and Checksum. Other
fields may be defined in the Data part such as the Identifier,
sequence numbers in ICMP echo request (type 8) and reply
(type 0).
The size of fields “type” and “code” is one byte. These
latter indicate the purpose of the ICMP packet. The Checksum
field is useful to check the integrity of the ICMP message.
The identifier number and the sequence number are encoded
with two bytes. They allow to match the ICMP echo reply
messages to the echo request messages. Finally, the content of
the Data can be filled by fixed bytes padding that depends on
the operating system.
For Linux, the ICMP Echo Request payload contains 56
bytes, among them 8 bytes are used as a timestamp and the
remainder match a fixed pattern. For the Windows operating
system, the ICMP payload contains 32 bytes of sorted alpha-
bets.
Type Code Checksum
Data Header
Data Payload
Fig. 1: ICMP frame format
B. Proposed Method
In order to discover covert channels, we apply two cate-
gories of verification. In the first step, we control the shape of
ICMP messages. If suspicious activity is revealed, we pursue
our inspection through pattern matching operations, which are
considered greedier in term of computing resources. Figure 2
resumes the different verification controls that we will perform.
Check the common size 
of ICMP messages
Check the absence of 
spike of ICMP messages
Check if there is 
only one reply for a given 
echo request
Incomming ICMP packets within a 
specified period of time
Normal channel
Cover channel
Check Patterns
True
False
False
False
True
False
True
True
Fig. 2: Proposed Method
1) Stage 1 - Analysis of ICMP messages shape:
During the stage 1 of our inspection, we start the verification
with the size of ICMP data field. Mostly, this size must be
equal to 32 bytes (Windows) or 56 bytes (Linux). If it is not
the case, we trigger the second stage of inspection. Otherwise,
we execute a second verification control at stage 1. During
this test, we compute the number of ICMP echo replies
associated to the same echo request. Association is ensured
if there is a correspondence between the identifier and the
sequence number. Usually, it must be only one association.
If it is not the case, we start Stage 2 with pattern matching
operations. Otherwise, we execute the last verification control
in stage 1. In this case, we calculate the rate of ICMP
messages regarding the rest of network traffic in a fixed size
sliding window. If we notice a large increase if this rate, we
start stage 2 of inspection. Else, we consider that the ICMP
message is normal.
We use the sliding window principle to calculate the ICMP
message rate with respect to the whole traffic. Fig. 3 shows
the computing inside the sliding window. Each window is
composed of fixed number of time intervals (IT). Detection
is only triggered with the reception of an ICMP packet.
Besides, we use the previous ICMP packet to calculate the
window’s shift. For example, the interarrival time between two
consecutives ICMP packets is about 3 interval times in Fig. 3.
In this case, we have to update only IT0, IT1 and IT2 and
keep IT3 to compute the ICMP messages rate at window 2.
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window2
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Fig. 3: Sliding Window
We present in Algorithm 1 the different tests achieved dur-
ing the stage 1. We define the two functions “count icmp pkt”
and “count all pkt” to compute respectively the number of
ICMP messages and all received packets. Besides, the function
“count icmp same addr Id” calculates the number of ICMP
messages that have the same identifier or sequence number as
the current analyzed packet “p”. If we succeed in one test of
stage 1, then we use the function “phase2 inspection(p)” to
start stage 2.
2) Stage 2 - Analysis of ICMP messages content:
We are looking in this stage at the content of ICMP
messages. Mostly, the operating systems use a constant
payload to build the ICMP message. For example, Microsoft
Windows uses the pattern ”0x61 0x62 ... 0x77” while Linux
employs the pattern ”0x08 0x09 ... 0x37”. We can inspect
foreach packet p in logfile do
X=count all pkt(p, prev, Win.size);
if p.proto=ICMP then
Y=count icmp pkt(p, prev, Win.size);
Z=count icmp same addr Id(p,prev,Win.size);
if (p.size6=32) and (p.size6=56) then
stage2 inspection(p);
else
if Z > 2 then
stage2 inspection(p);
else
if Y / X > Threshold then
stage2 inspection(p);
else
p is normal;
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Stage 1
all bytes in ICMP data field. However, such action will
consume a lot of memory and time. To resolve this problem,
we introduce two heuristics to ensure the verification. Our
first strategy is to compare N successive random bytes from
a random position pos. We present in Algorithm 2 such
verification.
Let pattern Linux the constant content of an ICMP
message sent by a Linux machine ;
Let pattern Win the constant content of an ICMP
message sent by a Windows machine;
N=rand mod 8+1;
Pos=rand mod 24 +1;
Sub pattern Linux= substring(pattern Linux,N,pos);
Sub pattern Win= substring(pattern Windows,N,pos);
Sub pkt Linux =substring (p.data+8,N,pos);
Sub pkt win=substring (p.data,N,pos);
Find Linux=match(Sub pkt Linux,Sub pattern Linux);
Find Win=match(Sub pkt Win,Sub pattern Win) ;
if Find Linux or Find Win then
Then p is normal;
else
p is a covert channel at p.timestamp;
end
Algorithm 2: Stage 2 using random pattern matching
We define another content verification using the hash
function MD5. Indeed, we compute for each pattern its hash
value on 128 bits. Then, for each analyzed packet, we check
if the hash of the packet content is identical to one of the two
possible hash values. In case of equality, we decide that the
packet is legitimate, else we mark the packet as a part of a
covert channel. We describe this verification in Algorithm 3.
Let pattern Linux the constant content of an ICMP
message sent by a Linux machine ;
Let pattern Win the constant content of an ICMP
message sent by a Windows machine;
Hash Linux=MD5(P.data+8);
Hash Win=MD5(P.data);
Find Linux=compare(Hash Linux,Hash pattern Linux);
Find Win=compare(Hash Win,Hash pattern Win);
if Find Linux or Find Win then
Then p is normal;
else
p is a covert channel at p.timestamp;
end
Algorithm 3: Stage 2 using MD5 hashing
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
A. Experimental environnment
In order to mount our experiment, we setup two virtual
machines on VMWAR. Besides, we install an attack tool called
Ptunnel on two machines to serve as a Ptunnel client and a
Ptunnel server (See Fig. 4). Ptunnel allows to reliably tunnel
TCP connections to a remote host through ICMP packets.
Traffic can be analyzed on an intrusion detection system
deployed between the machines. It’s also possible to retrieve
traffic at the destination machine (Ptunnel server) as the latter
can be considered as the target of the attack.
Firewall
Ptunnel client running & any 
TCP browsers / Cient
ICMP
Ptunnel / Proxy 
Server
Firewall
TCP
Fig. 4: Ptunnel Setup
The configuration of the Ptunnel server is easy and requires
only to indicate the reception network interface. Hence, it
suffices to tape this command ”Ptunnel -c interface” .
The configuration of the Ptunnel client varies regarding the
intended traffic to vehiculate. For example, if we would like to
tunnel http traffic, we have to reconfigure the browser proxy
on the client machine to localhost:8000. Besides, we execute
the command ” Ptunnel -p addr serv -lp 8000 -da dest addr
-dp dest port” where lp, da and dp represent respectively the
listen port, the destination address after reaching the proxy
and the port that the proxy should use to tunnel the TCP
connection. Fig. 5 gives the result of such execution when we
would like to reach the url ”www.google.tn”. We can notice
that the number of echo reply messages exceeds the one of
echo requests. Besides, the ICMP payload contains the string
”HTTP 1.0”.
Fig. 5: Captured packets after the execution of ptunnel
We can also tunnel other types of traffic. For example, the
command ” Ptunnel -p addr serv -lp 8000 -da ssh dest addr
-dp 22 ” permits to vehiculate ssh traffic through ICMP
messages.
To discern the existence of hidden channels, we have
to capture network traffic and to conduct our analysis. The
inspection is done on 2 stages. First of all, we look for unusual
ICMP messages size, abundance of ICMP echo reply messages
with the same identifier and a spike of the number of ICMP
packets. Then, we confirm our inspection by filtering the ICMP
data field searching for habitual patterns.
During our experiments, we execute Wireshark to capture
network traffic. We export collected packets into PDML file.
PDML is a structured XML document that contains details
about packets dissection. We develop our proper program to
parse XML using DOM (Document Object Model) program-
ming API.
B. Exeprimental results and discussion
We carried out a set of experiences in presence of normal
ICMP as well as covert channels. The hidden channel can be
the result of interaction with a Web server or a SSH server. We
compare in the first experiment the size of Data field of the
ICMP messages. As shown in Fig. 6, the normal ICMP traffic
has two possible sizes: 32 bytes in case of a Windows operating
system and 56 bytes when dealing with a Linux machine.
A covert channel interacting with a Web server modifies the
common size of ICMP data field. Indeed, when tunneling the
protocol HTTP, the ICMP data field has the size 28 bytes if it
carries HTTP requests, and different bigger sizes (above 500
bytes in our case) if it encapsulates HTTP replies.
Fig. 6 displays also the effect of tunneling a SSH session
inside an ICMP based covert channel. The size of ICMP data
field varies from 28 bytes to 200 bytes. Small packets are
explained by the interactive nature of SSH application. Accu-
mulation of sent bytes is possible thanks to Nagle Algorithm.
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Fig. 6: ICMP Data Size in Normal Traffic and Covert
Channels
Our second experiment verifies the occurrence of the same
ICMP sequence number. We notice in Fig. 7 that in normal
traffic each sequence number figures twice, one for the echo-
request message and another for the echo-reply message. How-
ever, the number of utilization becomes variable in presence of
covert channels interacting either with HTTP or SSH servers.
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Number
Eventually, we evaluate the rate of ICMP messages with
respect to the rest of traffic. The computation is done within a
window size of 4 seconds with a step equals to 1 second.
Fig. 8 shows that in normal conditions, ICMP traffic is
not too present, and never exceeded in our experimentation
0.37. Hence, we choose this value as a threshold to mark
an abnormal ICMP traffic. Covert channel toward a HTTP
server leads the ICMP messages rate to reach 0.9, whereas
the interaction with a SSH server, can bring this rate up to
0.7.
DoS attacks can be misinterpreted as hidden channels since
they also cause a spike of ICMP packets. To avoid this false
alarm, we verify in Phase 2 of the detection process, the
content of ICMP messages.
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V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We applied our detection method on a traffic generated by
standard ping, personalized ping and the Ptunnel tool. Standard
pings are issued from Windows and Linux operating systems.
Besides, under Linux, we employ two options that modify the
standard ping, the packet size (-s packetsize) and the payload
(-p pattern). Ptunnel is used to communicate with a HTTP
server and a SSH server. In total, we have 1266 ICMP packets,
scattered in the network traffic. There are 751 ICMP messages
that belong to covert channels, the other part (515 ICMP
packets) is normal ICMP exchanges.
We show in Table I the confusion matrix to depict our
detection results. In this execution, we choose to rely on the
hashing test to ensure the phase 2 of our inspection. We
succeed to reveal all malicious ICMP packets (751 messages),
without generating any false negatives. False negatives are still
possible since we could have collision with MD5 hashing, but
this is very scarce. However, we detect 8 false positives due
to changing the size of ICMP messages.
TABLE I: Confusion Matrix using Hashing Function
Prediction → Covert channel Normal traffic
Actual traffic ↓
Covert channel 751 0
Normal traffic 8 507
We draw in Table II our detection results when using
random pattern matching. In this execution, we detect only
745 malicious ICMP packets. The obtained 6 false negatives
are due to a tricky modification of the ICMP messages pattern.
In fact, the intruder inserts a secret message, just after the
common pattern used by the operating system. Besides, we
get 7 false positives because a legal modification of the ICMP
data field.
TABLE II: Confusion Matrix using random Pattern Matching
Prediction → Covert channel Normal traffic
Actual traffic ↓
Covert channel 745 6
Normal traffic 7 508
We compare in Table III the performance of the two
ICMP content analysis methods. We give successively the
True Positive Rate (TPR) or precision, the True Negative Rate
(TNR), the False Positive Rate (FPR), the False Negative Rate
(FNR), the accuracy and the time execution. The two methods
present almost the same performance. Random Pattern Match-
ing generates more false negatives but it is faster than hashing
function. Since covert channels may require many packets to
transfer information, we can rely on Random Pattern matching
to discover them. Occasionally we execute MD5 hashing to
prevent possible false negatives.
TABLE III: Performance of Covert Channel Detection
TPR TNR FPR FNR Accuracy run time
Hashing function 1 0.98 0.015 0 0.99 353 ms
Random Pattern 0.99 0.98 0.013 0.008 0.98 4 ms
Matching
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A covert channel is a stealth communication mechanism
that allows two or many participants to exchange unauthorized
data. It represents a real and dangerous threat that affects the
confidentiality and availability in an information system. In
addition to data leakage, covert channel can be a means to
bypass security devices and to control remote machines.
We propose in this paper a promising method to detect
ICMP based covert channels. We undergo the received traffic
a series of tests that begin with a simple size verification.
Besides, we inspect in a sliding window, the ICMP messages
rate as well as the replication of ICMP sequence numbers. In
case of suspect traffic, we pursue our analysis by conducting
a fast random pattern matching or a more accurate hashing
verification test. Our experimentation shows that the two de-
tection methods have almost the same accuracy and precision.
However random pattern matching is faster.
As a future work, we will investigate the generalization of
our method to discover other types of covert channels using
any network protocol. Besides, we will conduct time series
analysis in order to tackle the problem of temporal covert
channel.
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